When Law is Fact by Busch, Benjamin
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 24 Issue 4 Article 8 
1955 
When Law is Fact 
Benjamin Busch 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Benjamin Busch, When Law is Fact , 24 Fordham L. Rev. 646 (1955). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol24/iss4/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
FORDIJAM LAW REVIEW
or Poor Man's Court exercising unified jurisdictior over small civil matters and
minor crimes, and all family matters where the awards for support or main-
tenance are small. This court should be so administered as to provide to the
poor citizens of that city the expeditious and complete judicial relief in one
hearing and in one court to which the citizens of this great democratic city are
of right entitled. For much too long this right has been denied our poorer
citizens by the statutory disorganization of the inferior courts of New York
City.39
WHEN LAW IS FACT*
BENJAMIN BUSCHt
There are not many subjects upon which legal theorists and practical lawyers
alike have in recent times centered such avid attention as the matter of pleading
and proof of foreign law.' The occasion of an appellate court decision which
39. No article on our New York City inferior courts should end without some comment,
though it be a footnote, upon the selection of its judges; for though its organization be
corrected, it will still be the character of its judges which will determine the quality of the
court. Since the "poor man's court" will so vitally affect the normal life of the citizenry,
that citizenry must be equipped with some means of expressing approval or disapproval and
effecting a change at the ballot box if necessary. Direct election of judges, while theoreti-
cally attractive, is unworkable, for what voter can possibly inform himself to intelligently
vote upon candidates for over one hundred judgeships. Centralization of responsibility upon
the Mayor for all important appointive, administrative and judicial offices has provided a
practical means of accountability at the polls, for the quality or lack of quality in such
appointments has been a determining factor in his or his party's election or defeat at the
periodic accounting periods called elections. In years past Mayors have been subjected to
not inconsiderable political pressures from district leaders of their party. In more recent
years these pressures have been somewhat tempered by the practice of the Mayor's submit-
ting the names of all judicial appointees to the appropriate committees of the Association of
the Bar, and the findings of these committees as to "qualified" or "not qualified" have been
a determining factor in city judicial appointments. It would seem wise to write this salutory
practice into the statute creating and organizing the proposed new court. The Mayor should
be empowered to appoint as judges only those named by him on an unpublicized panel of
nominees which the committees of the Bar have found to be qualified. Our Mayors should
welcome such a provision since it would tend to free them from political pressures and
ensuing embarrassments. Such statutory provision would place great responsibility and
possibly subject to great political pressures the committees of our bar association, but It is
believed they would be found worthy of rendering true public service none the less. However,
it would become necessary for the various appropriate committees of our several bar associa-
tions to effect a much more coordinated means of working together than presently exists.
* Extension of an address before 78th Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association,
August 21, 1955, International and Comparative Law Committee.
t Member of the New York Bar. Member of the firm of Katz and Sommerich, New
York City.
1. Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 Yale L.J. 1018 (1941); Keefe,
Landis & Shaad, Sense and Nonsense About judicial Notice, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 664 (1950);
Schlesinger, Comparative Law Cases and Materials (1950); McCormick, judicial Notice, 5
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challenges concepts on that subject, long viewed as well settled, is certain to
be stimulating and full of interest. The case of Siegelman v. Cunard Whlte
Star,2 recently decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, accordingly warrants a close inspection and analysis.
I. THE S1EGELmAx CAsz
The complaint in that action alleges that on September 24, 1949, while
plaintiff's wife was a passenger on the S.S. Queen Elizabeth, she suffered an
injury when both she and the dining room chair, in which she was seated, were
overthrown by the action of the sea. The answer, in addition to a general
denial, alleges that the passenger had assumed the risk of the voyage, and also,
that the passage was governed by the terms and conditions of the ticket which
provided that there could be no recovery from damage due to dangers of the
sea or acts of God. It was also alleged as a defense that the ticket contract
required a suit to be commenced within one year from the day of injury, and
that since the action was brought on December 14, 1951, the contract had not
been complied with and that recovery was barred.
The suit, which had been commenced in the New York State court, was re-
moved to the federal courts on the grounds of diversity. A motion was made
in the District Court for a dismissal of the complaint, on the ground that the
action was barred by the period of limitations specified in the contract.0
The affidavit in support of the motion briefly set forth the pertinent dates
referred to above, which were conceded, and referred to the terms and provi-
sions of the contract of passage, which were likewise conceded. In addition to
the one year limitation on suits, the ticket also contained a provision that "All
questions arising on this contract ticket shall be decided according to English
Law with reference to which this contract is made."
The affidavit in opposition to the motion to dismiss brought forth the facts
that the original attorney for the plaintiffs had discussed settlement with the
Cunard claim agent, and that shortly before the expiration of the year from the
date of injury, he had asked said claim agent whether it would be necessary to
begin suit in order to protect his clients' rights. Upon being told that no suit
was necessary, in view of the prospect of an early settlement, the attorney took
no further action. Thereafter, Mrs. Siegelman died from a coronary thrombosis
(it does not appear that this had any relationship to the injury originally sus-
tained), and the settlement offer was withdrawn, on the ground that it could
be tendered only to the injured party.
A contest for letters of administration ensued between the plaintiff and
relatives of the deceased, and such letters were not issued to the plaintiff until
June 7, 1951. On December 14, 1951, the suit was begun.
Vand. L. Rev. 296 (1952); H. L. Jones, International Judicial Assistance Act, 62 Yale L.J.
515 (1953); Sommerich & Busch, The Expert Witness and the Proof of Foreign Law, 38
Cornell L.Q. 125 (1953) ; Nussbaum, Proving the Law of Foreign Countries, 3 Am. J. Comp.
L. 60 (1954); Note, Evidence: Presumptions as to the Law of Foreign Countries, 42
Calif. L. Rev. 701 (1954).
2. 221 F. 2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955).
3. Siegelmran v. Cunard White Star, Civil No. 72-148, S!l.N.Y., Jan. 3, 1952.
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No reference was made to English law by either of the parties upon the
hearing of the motion to dismiss. Upon that state of the record, there would
have been authority for a determination by the District Court that the law of
this jurisdiction is the only law before the court in the absence of proof of the
law of the foreign jurisdiction; 4 or stated in another manner, the failure of the
parties to prove foreign law raised the presumption that they acquiesced in the
application of the law of the forum.5
The District Court relied upon neither of these presumptions and based its
opinion upon the language of the contract which provided for the one year limi-
tation for suits and which made invalid any changes in the contract unless
signed by the chief agent at the port of embarkation, and which required all
questions arising on the contract to be decided according to English law.
The only question which the court considered decisive was whether a claim
agent could, under British law, waive the one year contractual limitation. After
pointing out that under New York law, the modification of a contractual limi-
tation must be in writing and signed by the chief agent at the port of embarka-
tion, the opinion states: "There has been no allegation or proof that the law of
England is different from that of New York,"" and English precedent is cited7
to show that the law of England is allegedly in accord with the law of New
York, as stated.
The opinion further states that if either of the parties contended that the law
of England has been misinterpreted by the court, they could submit additional
affidavits of experts on the subject of English law within ten days from the date
of the decision. The record of the case fails to show that any affidavits were
submitted by any of the parties on the subject of English law.
The motion to dismiss the action was granted, and an appeal was taken to
the United States Court of Appeals. The appellant's brief8 argued that under
New York and federal law, a contractual stipulation limiting the time to sue
may be waived by words or conduct despite a condition prohibiting alteration
or amendment except by a designated person in writing. The English precedent
cited by the District Court was distinguished on the theory that the sole ques-
tion there involved was the scope of authority of a person whose duties were
ministerial. The appellant likewise contended that "English law, if it be con-
sidered, is no different than that enunciated by New York and federal author-
ity,"9 citing three English cases in support of that proposition.10 The second
point in appellant's brief was that the defendant's promise of settlement and its
representation that a timely suit need not be commenced, constituted a waiver
4. Bayer v. Lovelace, 204 Mass. 327, 90 N.E. 538 (1910).
S. Leary v. Gledhill, 8 N.J. 260, 84 A. 2d 725 (1951); Sturm v. Sturm, 111 N.J. Eq.
579, 587, 163 Atl. 5, 8-9 (1932); 67 L.R.A. 33, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 261.
6. See note 3 supra.
7. Barnett, Hoares & Co. v. South London Tramways Co., 18 Q.B.D. 815 (1887).
8. Brief for Appellant, p. 6, Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, 221 F. 2d 189 (2d Cir.
1955).
9. Id. at 8.
10. Id. at 8.
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of the limitation on the suit. No English cases were relied upon in connection
with this argument.
Appellee, in its brief,1 argued that under the law of the United States, it had
neither waived its contract nor was it estopped from asserting it, and that there
was no waiver of appellant's contract rights under the governing English law.
The clause in the ticket, that English law governs, was quoted and many
English cases cited in support of the last contention.
A reply brief' 2 was filed by the appellant, taking violent objection to appel-
lee's reliance upon English law. The brief states: "Appellee failed to submit
any English law on the hearing of the motion in District Court, and here for
the first time cites such justification of its position."21 3 The brief continues:
"English law is not applicable to this case. First, it has not been pleaded or
proved. Liverpool & G.W. Steam Nay. Co. v. Phoenix, 129 U.S. 397, 445, 9
S. Ct. 469, 473, 32 L. Ed. 788. Second, because both the lex loci contractus and
the forum are American, the application of English law to lessen, weaken or
avoid appellant's claim for damages is contrary to public policy .... M4
Several grounds were open to the Court of Appeals for its determination that
English law governed the case before it even though not pleaded or proved. It
could have been determined that the parties, having failed to take advantage of
the opportunity to submit affidavits of experts on the English law relied upon
by the District Court, must be presumed to have acquiesced in the application
of the laws of England. It could also have been determined that the appellant
himself had rested his case on English law, inasmuch as he had submitted
English authority to support his contention that both under English, New York,
and federal authorities, the limitation for suit had been waived. Having ad-
vanced English precedents to support his own case, he could hardly have
been heard to object to the submission by appellee of English authority in
support of its contentions.
The majority opinion of the Circuit Court avoided either of these alternatives
and fired, with complete abandon, the edict that it was within its competence
to apply English law, because pleading foreign law is unnecessary and because
judicial notice could be taken of foreign law, whether or not pleaded or proved.1'
In tacit recognition of the fact that pleading the foreign law relied on had
always, at least in the past, been a requirement, 16 the opinion rests for support
upon Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,17 which states that a short
and plain statement of the claim, showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,
is sufficient, and that furthermore it is not necessary to set out the legal theory
on which the claim is based, citing Gins v. Mauser Plumbing Supply Co., Inc.28
11. Brief for Appellee, p. 4, Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, 221 F. 2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955).
12. Reply brief for Appellant, p. 1, Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, 221 F. 2d 189 (2d
Cir. 1955).
13. Id. at 1.
14. Id. at 1-2.
15. 221 F. 2d at 196.
16. Liverpool & G.W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397, 444-46 (1889).
17. 28 US.CA. (1950).
18. 148 F. 2d 974 (2d Cir. 1945).
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So startling an innovation as the pronouncement that foreign law need not
be pleaded merits a study of the authority relied upon. Gins v. Mauser, it turns
out, does not involve foreign law at all, but relates solely to the law of bank-
ruptcy. The pleading in that case contained five separate causes of action, which
recited the same underlying facts five separate times in the light of five differ-
ent legal theories, and the court properly indicated its criticism with the sugges-
tion that the repetition was unnecessary for each particular legal theory of
counsel, and that it was "the court's duty to grant the relief to which the
prevailing party is entitled, whether demanded or not."19
The distinction between that case, involving statutory domestic bankruptcy
laws, and cases involving the laws of other countries would seem to be apparent
without the necessity of further comment.
The prevailing rule with regard to pleading foreign law was quite recently
stated in New York upon the dismissal of a complaint for insufficiency in plead-
ing as follows:2 0 "As to common law countries, the courts of this state will
assume, in the absence of a contrary showing, that their common law is the
same as that of this state, which recognizes no right of privacy. As to other
than common law countries, no assumption will be indulged in that their law
is the same as ours, and the foreign law must be proved."2 1
A Federal District Court stated the same rule even more forcibly in F.A.R.
Liquidating Corp. v. Brownell2 2 with the following language: "If foreign law is
relied on, it must be pleaded and its substance, at least, laid out as a fact."
(Citing: Empresa Agricola Chicama Ltda. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 57 F.
Supp. 649, 650; Iajrate v. The Liberte, 106 F. Supp. 619; United States v.
National City Bank of New York, 7 F.R.D. 241, 243; The lean Jadot, 14 F.
Supp. 161.)23 And again: "Unless foreign law is expressly pleaded 'the case
must be decided according to the law of the federal courts as a question of
general commercial law.' Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129
U. S. 397, 444-446, 9 S. Ct. 469, 473, 32 L. Ed. 788.1'24
A very pointed indication of the rule of law in force in New York State on
this subject was most recently made by the Appellate Division, First Depart-
ment, in Greiner v. Freund.25 The plaintiff in that case had been ordered to
19. Id. at 976.
20. Schumann v. Loew's Inc., 135 N.Y.S. 2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
21. Id. at 366. It is of interest to compare this with the following statement of the
United States Supreme Court in Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 621 (1953): "It
does not seem justifiable to assume what we all know is not true--that French law and our
law are the same. Such a view ignores some of the most elementary facts of legal history-
the French reception of Roman law, the consequences of the Revolution, and the Napoleonic
codifications. If the Government contends that these marriages were ineffectual from the
beginning, it would seem to require proof of particular rules of the French law of domestic
relations."
22. 130 F. Supp. 691 (Del. 1955).
23. Id. at 694.
24. Id. at 695. It should be noted that the court relies upon the Liverpool case which the
majority opinion in the Siegelman case stated was out of date.
25. 286 App. Div. 996, 144 N.Y.S. 2d 766 (1st Dep't 1955). Cf. Pfleuger v. Pfleuger, 304 N.Y.
148, 106 N.E. 2d 495 (1952), where the court took judicial notice of the statute of a sister state
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allege facts sufficient to charge the defendant with a certain obligation. The
plaintiff endeavored to comply by pleading that such obligation was imposed
upon the defendant under the laws of Austria, without setting out the text or
substance upon which he allegedly relied. The dismissal for insufficiency of that
cause of action was affirmed by the appellate court upon the ground that no
hint was given "... . as to the nature or identity of the laws, as to whether
they are statutory or decisional .. ." or ... . the purport of the allegedly
applicable laws as allegations of facL" 20
In the opinion of the court, the failure of the plaintiff to indicate within which
one of the several statutory codes in force in Austria the transaction fell, ham-
pered the defendant in answering the complaint and rendered the pleading
defective. The court flatly stated its refusal to exercise its discretion under
section 344-a of the Civil Practice Act and take judicial notice of laws
".... where merely their purported effect is pleaded in complete disregard of
the requirement of the plain and concise statement of material facts recited in
section 241, C.P.A."127
It does not appear that there is any adequate body of precedent to support
a contention that pleading the foreign law is now clearly unnecessary. There
is authority to the contrary.28
The majority opinion in the Siegelnman case indicates that it was no great
difficulty for the court to dispose of the question pertaining to the necessity of
pleading the foreign law, and states that the question whether the appellate
court was at liberty to interpret and apply foreign law, which had not been
proved below, was a more difficult question.
Analyzing the problem, the court finds that when sources of foreign law were
not readily accessible, it was impractical to expect a judge to ascertain applicable
foreign law, and that this accounts for the requirement heretofore in this coun-
try that foreign law be proved as a fact, if it is to be applied. It is noted that
an increasing availability of the laws of jurisdictions within the United States
encouraged statutes for the judicial notice of such laws.2 9 The opinion further
finds that while difficulty of ascertainment of foreign law might have been a
(Pa.), and held that the defendants could obtain relief as to knowledge of the statutes relied
upon by a motion to make more definite and certain or by a motion for a bill of particulars,
citing Busch, Bills of Particulars of Foreign Law, 125 N.Y.LJ., No. 46, p. 836, col. 1 (March
8, 1951); Meijer v. General Cigar Co., 73 N.Y.S.2d 576 (Sup. Ct. 1947), modified, 273
App. Div. 760, 75 N.Y.S. 2d 536 (1st Dep't 1947), where it was held that the allegation of
a specific foreign decree was evidentiary and should be stricken; de Cordova v. Sanville,
214 N.Y. 662, 108 N.E. 1092 (1915), decided on the dissenting opinion in 16S App. Div.
128, 150 N.Y. Supp. 709 (1st Dep't 1914), where it was held that the ultimate fact, and not
the evidence must be alleged in a pleading; Raul International Corp. v. Morrison Corp., 282
App. Div. 1042, 126 N.Y.S. 2d 271 (1st Dep't 1953).
26. 286 App. Div. at 997, 144 N.Y.S. 2d at 767.
27. Ibid.
28. Schumann v. Loew's Inc., 135 N.Y.S. 2d 361 (Sup. CL 1954); Bergman v. Lax,
107 N.Y.S. 2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Schumann v. Loew's Inc., 199 M fisc. 38, 102 N.Y.S. 2d
572 (Sup. Ct. 1951). See also Sommerich, Report of the Committee on Foreign Law, 2
N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n Rec. 128 (1947); Pleading, Proof, and Judicial Notice of Foreign Law
(Editorial), 117 N.Y.J., No. 93, p. 1560, col. 1 (April 22, 1947).
29. Citing Comment, 42 Mich. L. Rev. 509,517, n. 65 (1943).
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reason for empowering a judge to disregard such law, if not proven, it was not
cause for requiring him to disregard it, and that some statutes, such as section
344-a of the Civil Practice Act, have permitted judges to apply unproven foreign
law, even though it is not readily accessible.30
Finally, the court concludes that since Rule 43 (a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure permits the presentation of evidence according to the rules of
evidence applied in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the
federal court is held, or whatever method is most convenient within the selection
permitted by said rule, that the New York judicial notice procedures, if most
liberal, should apply.3 '
Without limiting the rule thus enunciated to the facts before it and without
basing its conclusion upon the particular type of foreign law involved or its
characteristics, the majority opinion states: "The most convenient method of
presenting the foreign law is obviously not to have to introduce evidence on it
at all, but simply to treat it in the same fashion as domestic law. Consequently,
since a New York judge could consider and apply unproven foreign law, a
federal district judge sitting in New York may do likewise. To this extent the
Liverpool case, 1889, 129 U.S. 397, 9 S. Ct. 469, 32 L. Ed. 788, and the authori-
ties cited therein, are out of date. '3 2
Although not relevant to this discussion, it might be added that the majority of
the court did, as a result of its finding that it could interpret and apply foreign
law not proved below, ascertain that under English authorities (not referred to
either by the trial court or by counsel), in order to raise the issue of estoppel,
there must be a misrepresentation of a fact and not of intention, and that, there-
fore, it was not necessary to decide the effect that English law would give to the
provision requiring alterations of a contract to be in writing and over the
signature of the Cunard's chief agent at the port of embarkation.
The court assumed the authority of the Cunard claim agent to say that no
suit was necessary despite the forthcoming expiration of the time limitation
within which to bring such suit, but found that this was a statement of opinion,
and not of fact, and that, therefore, no estoppel had been proved. It was further
concluded that the plaintiff's delay in obtaining letters of administration would
not toll the Statute of Limitations under English law, but that even if the run-
ning of the period were suspended thereby, the lawsuit was begun too late, for
letters of administration were granted on June 7, 1951, and the action was not
commenced until December 14, 195 1.3
The outcome of the lawsuit is at least significant here, in that, as a result of
the ascertainment and application of a rule of foreign law, which had been
neither pleaded nor proved, nor discussed by the trial court or by counsel, the
plaintiff was denied any recovery whatever.34
30. Citing Callahan & Ferguson, Evidence and the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
47 Yale L. J. 194, 210-13 (1937).
31. 221 F. 2d at 196, citing 5 Moore, Federal Practice, § 43.09 (2d ed. 1955).
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. The dissenting opinion, assuming the propriety of applying English law, contributes
a brilliant discussion of "take-it-or-leave-it" contracts of "adhesion". Id. at 199-209.
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It is fair to inquire whether the authority cited on the point sustains the
majority's broad pronouncements as to an appellate court's right to interpret and
apply foreign law which has not been proved below.
Professor Hartwig's discussion of "the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign
Law Act,"35 cited by the majority opinion, relates exclusively to "jurisdictions
within the United States."36 This appears to be equally true of a comment37
dealing with the same topic, also cited by the majority opinion, which ends with
the contention that ". . . there would seem to be little reason for an appellate
court's refusal to use all available legal materials in repairing and correcting
the judgment of the trial court. The recent trend of legislation in this field
would seem to show a more general acceptance of this viewpoint."-3
The article by Callahan and Ferguson, referred to by the majority opinion,
is the only reference which discusses foreign law based upon a different system
of jurisprudence,39 and in this connection the authors concede that such laws
"may require more than mere statement and argument; the court should not be
called upon to make unreasonable researches, and in such cases might rightfully
require proof."40
Since all of the three scholarly works referred to deal with the question of
judicial notice on the broad view of philosophical inquiry, without reference to
the more limiting aspects of case law precedent, it may not be amiss to show
that both in theory and practice good reason exists why an appellate court
should not be permitted to interpret and apply the law of jurisdictions not
within the United States which has not been proved below.
Doubt concerning the propriety of a court's private research of foreign law
was very ably expressed by Mr. Justice Walter of the New York Supreme Court
in Arams v. Arams,41 where he stated: ".. . if cases now can be decided ac-
cording to whatever law the judge sees fit to apply and is able to discover by
his own private researches, undisclosed to the parties, then much that hitherto
has been regarded as essential to the right to pronounce judgment-the raising
of an issue determinable by reference to the law of a specified place, and an
opportunity to know what the deciding tribunal is considering and to be heard
with respect to both law and fact-would seem to have been abolished. I am
unwilling to assume that a power so contrary to the plainest principles of fair-
dealing and due process of law was intended or has been conferred."42
35. Hartwig, Congressional Enactment of Uniform judicial Notice Act, 40 Mich. L. Rev.
174, 176 (1941).
36. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
37. Comment, 42 Mich. L. Rev. 509 (1943).
38. Id. at 520.
39. Callahan & Ferguson, Evidence and the New Rules of Federal Procedure, 47 Yale
L.J. 194, 210-13 (1937).
40. Id. at 212 (Emphasis added.)
41. 182 Misc. 328, 45 N.Y.S. 2d 251 (Sup. CL 1943).
42. Id. at 330, 45 N.Y.S. 2d at 253 (Emphasis added.) The court cited Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 48 (1932); United States v. Abilene & So. Ry., 265 US. 274, 258-89
(1924); I.C.C. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 93 (1913); Standard Oil Co. v. Misoud,
224 U.S. 270, 281 (1912); Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U.S. 254, 264-66 (1891); Cohen v.
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United States District Judge Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., of the District of
Massachusetts, expressed the same sentiments when he delivered the 1952
Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture in New York City, entitled A Trial Judge's
Freedom and Responsibility, and stated: ". . . when a judge has tended to
reach his result partly on the basis of general information and partly on the
basis of his studies in a library . .. it seems to me that the judge, before deriv-
ing any conclusions from any such extra-judicial document or information,
should lay it before the parties for their criticism." 43
The Model Code of Evidence of the American Law Institute envisions similar
restraints, even though it deals with judicial notice of the common law and
statutes of every jurisdiction of the United States. 44 Thus, it provides: "(1)
The judge shall inform the parties of the tenor of any matter to be judicially
noticed by him and afford each of them reasonable opportunity to present to him
information relevant to the propriety of taking such judicial notice or to the
tenor of the matter to be noticed." 45
A recent article4 6 contains an interesting observation in point, stating: "The
construction of an edifice of factual data-dicta of judges inadequately trained
or completely untrained in international law and its appropriate techniques, and
assertions in diplomatic correspondence that partake more of the character of
advocacy than of judgment-and the weighing of this edifice in metaphorical
scales is not a satisfactory process." 47
These statements of principle are supported by well-established precedent,
both in New York, in the federal courts, and the courts of England.
Since the advent of section 344-a of the Civil Practice Act, upon which the
majority opinion in the Siegelman case wholly based its actions, the Court of
Appeals of New York, in Sonnesen v. Panama Transport Co.,48 refused to take
judicial notice of the laws of Panama and ordered a new trial to enable the foreign
law to be proved. The court explained its action with the following statement: "We
are not entitled to assume that the maritime law of Panama (a "civil law"
country) is the same as ours, or as any part of ours (Ozanic v. United States,
165 F. 2d 738, 744). Furthermore, we do not think this an appropriate case in
which, under section 344-a of the Civil Practice Act, to take judicial notice of
the foreign law. Since the trial was on an erroneous theory, we, in the interests
of justice, order a reversal and grant a new trial as to the first alleged cause of
action."49
City Company, 283 N.Y. 112, 27 N.E.2d 803, 805 (1940); Jackson v. Strong, 222
N.Y. 149, 154, 118 N.E. 512, 513 (1917); Lamphere v. Lang, 213 N.Y. 585, 588, 108 N.E.
82, 83 (1915); Clapp v. McCabe, 84 Hun 379, 387-90 (Sup. Ct. 1895), aff1d, 155 N.Y. 525,
50 N.E. 274 (1898), followed in Berg v. Oriental Consolidated Mining Co., 70 N.Y.S. 2d
19 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
43. N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n Rec. 280,294-95 (1952).
44. See Schlesinger, Cases and Materials on Comparative Law 124 (1950).
45. Model Code of Evidence rule 804 (1942).
46. O'Connell, A Critique of the Iranian Oil Litigation, 4 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 267 (1955).
47. Id. at 293.
48. 298 N.Y. 262, 82 N.E. 2d 569 (1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 919 (1949).
49. Id. at 267, 82N.E.2d at 571. See also Industrial Export & Import Corp. v.
Hongkong, 302 N.Y. 342, 98 N.E. 2d 466 (1951); 8 Carmody-Wait 740, n. 14 (1954).
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These principles are well grounded in the roots of English law and are firmly
observed by the English courts today."
One of the surprising features of the decision in the Siegelman case is that
the same court had earlier handed down decisions at complete variance with the
new doctrine, and these contradicting decisions were approved by two of the
judges sitting on the Siegelman case.
Thus, in United States ex rel. Jelic v. District Director of Immigration,5' the
majority opinion specifically held that the court could not take judicial notice
of German law where no evidence of the German law was presented below,
notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 43 (a) of the Federal Rules or section
391 of New York Civil Practice Act (permitting judicial notice).
In United States v. Ukl,52 it was stated that "foreign law itself is a fact to
be proved."53
More recently, the same court in Usatorre v. The Victoria,"4 stated that
foreign law is a fact and remanded the case, amongst other reasons, for addi-
tional proof and findings with respect to applicable Argentine law.
A hasty review of recent federal and New York decisions plainly indicates
that there is no trend whatever toward the elimination of any requirement that
foreign law be pleaded and proved; indeed the trend is quite to the reverse.
In Mosbacker v. Basler Lebens Versicherungs G.,5 the court stated: "In
complex matters exclusively governed by foreign law, such as the case at bar,
expert testimony is critically important to the Court. No issue as important as
this should be resolved on partial or inadequate disclosureY50
In Valle v. Stockard SIS Corp.,57 relief was denied for failure of full proof
of Italian law, citing Sonnesen v. Panama Transport Co.
In Matter of Lopezr s the court conceded its power to take judicial notice of
the laws of Spain, but in the exercise of discretion, decided to require proof of
such laws.
In Berweger v. Berweger,59 no offer of proof was made as to the laws of
Germany, and the court refused to take judicial notice thereof.
50. "Before the question whether foreign law is applicable can arise at all-vth its
consequent problems of dassification and the interpretation of the relevant foreign provi-
sions-the parties must have raised the issue. It is not for the judge to suggest that a
foreign system of law might be appropriate in a case before him. He is an English judge in
an English court, sworn to administer English law, and, indeed, English law is the only
system of which knowledge can be imputed to him. In consequence, foreign law, if the
parties wish to raise it, must be proved to him; it is a matter of fact, and, like other facts,
must be established by evidence." J.A.C. Thomas, Private International Law 31 (1955).
51. 106 F. 2d 14 (2d Cir. 1939).
52. 137 F. 2d 858 (2d Cir. 1943).
53. Id. at 861.
54. 172 F. 2d 434 (2d Cir. 1949).
55. 111 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
56. Id. at 552.
57. 129 N.YLJ., No. 126, p. 2155, col 4 (Sup. Ct 1953), reargued, 130 N.YS. 2d 550
(Sup. Ct. 1953).
58. 131 N.Y.LJ., No. 19, p. 10, col. 7 (Surf. Ct. 1954).
59. 131 N.Y.LJ., No. 107, p. 7, col. 7 (Sup. Ct 1954), appeal dismissed, 137 N.Y-S. 2d
346 (App. Div., 1st Dep't 1954).
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In Harris v. American International Fuel & Petroleum Co.,00 the court held
that it could not judicially notice foreign law which must be pleaded and
proved as facts.
In Albert v. Brownell,61 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the laws
of Luxembourg are a question of fact in a domestic forum.
In Sinai v. Levi,6 2 the court refused to take judicial notice of the Statute of
Limitations prescribed by Italian law, the effect of which had not been pleaded.
The case of F.A.R. Liquidating Corp. v. Brownell, which has already been
discussed, is another evidence of the judicial trend to refuse to take judicial
notice of unproved foreign law.
In Sundberg v. Aktiebolget Svenska Amerika Linien,03 the court, while
acknowledging that it could take judicial notice of foreign law, refused to do so
with respect to Swedish law, because "nothing has been placed before me which
is informative or helpful in that connection. '64
Instances where courts have taken, or have indicated that they could take,
judicial notice of the laws of a foreign jurisprudence without proof, are few
and are open to explanation and distinction.65
II. CONCLUSION
In conclusion it may be stated that the legal literature prior to the enactment
of section 344-a 66 actually sought the elimination of the formalities of proof of
foreign law without any suggestion that the courts, at any stage of the proceed-
ing, should resort to the interpretation and application of foreign law which had
not been proved.
A recent statement to the same effect is to be found in Medvin v. Semken,07
where the following is stated: "The court recognizes that under section 344-a
of the Civil Practice Act it has discretion to take judicial notice of the law of
a sister state . . . . But the enactment of section 344-a does not dispense with
the need for proof; it simply devised a process by means of which the technical
rules of proving the matter specified in section 344-a could be dispensed with in
the discretion of the court." 68
60. 124 F. Supp. 878 (W.). Pa. 1954).
61. 219 F. 2d 602 (9th Cir. 1954).
62. 144 N.Y.S. 2d 316 (City Court, City of N.Y., 1955). In another hearing of the
same case, Sinai v. Levi, 134 N.Y.L.J., No. 76, p. 7, col. 4 (City Ct., City of N.Y., 1955)
the court again refused to exercise its discretion under § 344-a of the Civil Practice Act,
basing its decision upon the fact that "Neither litigant anywhere sets forth the Italian statute
itself .... "
63. 134 N.Y.L.J., No. 64, p. 8, col. 4 (City Ct., City of N.Y., Sept. 30, 1955).
64. Ibid.
65. Matter of Baruch, 131 N.Y.S. 2d 84, 86 (Surr. Ct. 1954); National City Bank of
N.Y. v. Beebe, 131 N.Y.S. 2d 67, 72 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Matter of Altman, 138 N.Y.S. 2d
336, 337 (Surr. Ct. 1954); Mangrelli v. Italian Line, 208 Misc. 685, 688, 144 N.Y.S. 2d 570,
573 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
66. WachtelI, Proof of Foreign Law in American Courts, 69 U.S.L. Rev. 526 (1935);
9 N.Y. Judicial Council Rep. 267, 279 (1943).
67. 131 N.Y.L.J., No. 109, p. 13, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
68. Ibid.
